Appendix W-A Alternative Schematic Representations of the End Product Locations and Penetration
where is the differentiation between m and n. (For survivability of n, f has to exceed a minimum threshold. This is presented in Appendix W-C as part of the proof of Proposition 1.)
Now notice that as f increases, P m , P c and P n increase till the following limit is reached. Here m and n are constrained local monopolies. , until m and n become true, unconstrained local monopolies.
When it is optimal to fully saturate end product market (i.e., saturate the backyards k and l) under e co-optor role (given that neither end product is dominated by the other), m and n would be th priced to extract the full valuation of the customers at the extremes. In that case,
. In this case, the interior of the market (of length f) is divided between m and n in the amounts 0.5-l and 0.5-m respectively. M's profits as a component supplier β The proof delineates the parameter space over which each of the three roles is optimal. This requires comparing , , and . The co-optor role is dominated by one of the other two roles when end products m and n are "near" perfect substitutes -the specific thresholds being identifiable by a combination of parameters R, q, f and β. For any higher level of differentiation, the co-optor role is optimal. Thus the relevant for profit comparisons is that in equation (A-11) from the previous appendix. The parts of the proofs relevant to Proposition (1) -the symmetric case of q=0 -are highlighted with the "♣" symbol. 
and l R q = . Equating the profits from the above two roles and simplifying, the profits from the two roles are equal when:
, which is quadratic in l. The positive root defines the level at which the two roles are equally attractive. When the actual l value is greater (or less) than this root, the co-optor role is more (or less) profitable than the sole entrant role. Under the co-optor role, we also check to ensure that the end products survive at the limits. 
and l R q = . The two roles are equally attractive when which is quadratic in l. When the actual l is greater (or less) than the positive root, the component supplier role is more (or less) profitable than the co-optor role. 
In delineating the optimality of the co-optor role, we ensure that when M wants to co-opt N it is incentive compatible for N to agree to the role.
♣ For the symmetric case when q=0, as the sole entrant role is more profitable than the component supplier role, it suffices to compare the profits from the sole entrant and cooptor roles to infer the optimal role for the MPCB -a condition given under the earlier bullet.
The above solutions yield the phase diagram in Figure 2 identifying the domains of optimality of the three strategies.
Proof of Proposition 3:

P3a(i):
Under the co-optor role, the end product price . From this peak, the price starts falling for higher levels of fβ (i.e., milder substitutes), following the path 
This suffices to prove P3a(ii) as at the threshold q, the sole entrant role dominates.
To prove P3b, note that 2 The suffix IP (below) represents independent producer (i.e., N does not depend on M for the component).
M's profits
M and N move simultaneously. For m to dominate n at the latter's location,
That is, r > (7/3)βf.
For N's profits as in equation (C-7) to be less than that from the co-optor role, β β β When r ≤ Min{0.2331(2R+fβ) -0.5359q, (7/3)fβ, for N not to prefer n to n, M must its component available at an incentive compatible price, that is the price at which N will make at least as much profit from M's component as it can from using its own inferior component.
Let the incentive compatible price be P i . Now, from (B-1) and (B-2) of Appendix W-B,
where f = 1 -k -l.
As before, M and N move simultaneously in the end product market. Therefore, if N's component n is not too inferior, it is profitable for M to restore the co-optor role by offering the component c to N at an incentive compatible price.
For P4(b), notice from equations (D-12) and (D-13) that P c and P m are increasing in r.
x Appendix W-E
Impact of a(n) (Un)Saturated Market and Downstream Duopoly on the MPCB's Optimal Prices and Profits
The downstream duopoly applies for the co-optor and component supplier roles. , and (iii)
As β reaches zero (representing an undifferentiated market), the market is fully saturated and the three strategies converge in their profit levels. To prove P5(b), we have taken the above closed form solutions for profits under the alternative roles and mapped the phase diagram in Figure 3 for β between 0 and 1 (changed in increments of 0.1) and q between -0.5 and 0.5 (also changed in increments of 0.1). The domains of optimality follow from this diagram.
xi
Appendix W-F Empirical Application: Estimation Procedure
Our model has the following 'parameters': (i) k and l, the locations of end products m and n respectively as perceived by the market; (ii) R m and R n , the maximum reservation prices for m and n respectively among consumers whose ideal points match the location of either product; (iii) transportation cost β per unit length, assumed to be the same for both products for all consumers.
The model parameters may all be estimated from measures of consumers' reservation We use a heuristic procedure to estimate locations k and l of m and n respectively. We draw on two statistics of the distribution of reservation prices: ρ , the correlation coefficient between the reservation prices for the two end products, and ) ( 
Appendix W-G Integrating Horizontal and Vertical Differentiation
Our intent here is limited to examining whether our normative guidelines on optimal end product roles from a parsimonious model of horizontal differentiation would hold when vertical differentiation is an added factor. We consider a linear Hotelling model with extreme product locations (as in §5.2.). We assume an end product monopoly under the sole entrant and component supplier roles. Parameters R, q, and β have their usual meaning. We assume that at any point on the Hotelling line, consumers' weight for quality is uniformly distributed in the interval [0, θ] and so their willingness to pay for m (or n), excluding horizontal transportation costs, is uniformly distributed in the interval [0, θR] (or [0, θ(R+q)]). While it is typical to introduce parameters θ 1 and θ 2 to suggest the quality ordering of the alternatives, the same objective is met in our case by the presence of parameter q. This framework simultaneously incorporates three possibilities: horizontal coverage (along the Hotelling line), the willingness of the market to pay up to θq more (or less, as with negative q) for the co-opted product, and vertical coverage (perpendicular to the Hotelling line).
The game structure and the derivations of the optimal solutions follow the same spirit as those in the paper. The profits from the sole entrant role ) and a messier expression (for lower β) that we have examined numerically. Our inference is that the incremental value of the vertical differentiation parameter θ is limited by the fact that we already have the parameter q to capture the quality differential between m and n. On the other hand, market saturation has a more nuanced meaning in the integrated model. For example, even when it is attractive to saturate the "prime" customers horizontally, it is optimal to certain segments untapped in a "vertical" direction.
We see the paper's findings on the optimality of alternative roles reinforced. The cooptor role is the most widely optimal, indeed more so than in the case of horizontal differentiation only. This is because, even when the (horizontal) transportation cost parameter β is low, end products m and n can co-exist given sufficient quality differentiation (positive or negative q). The sole entrant role is optimal over a range of low transportation cost and quality differential (specifically, when 
